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1 Introduction
his policy analysis examines the EU’s approach to Belarus, 
with the aim of making it more sustainable – that is, more 
efective, legitimate and compatible – in the future. Premised 
on a series of original cross-temporal research studies 
conducted in Belarus in 2008, 2013 and 2016, and through 
specialist knowledge of the country, the analysis advances 
three core tenets, which challenge existing conventions of 
the Eastern Partnership (EaP)1, and at the same time help 
facilitate principled pragmatism in EU external relations 
and foster resilience in the neighbourhood, as set out by the 
new Global Security Strategy (GSS 2016).
First, the analysis notes that Belarus is a small state, and 
that, consequently, it behaves like one – that is, it behaves 
like a maverick and is rent-seeking and recalcitrant. For 
policy-makers, this may sound problematic; for scholars 
of International Relations, it presents an opportunity. his 
is because small states are normally responsive to external 
opportunities, and may challenge the existing status quo 
as a way of redressing regional security misbalances where 
political dialogue is at a deadlock. he analysis explores the 
context and opportunities which may prove propitious for 
reinvigorating EU-Belarus relations and enhancing Belarus’ 
role in the region.
Second, the analysis claims that Belarus, like every other 
state in the post-Soviet space, is normatively diferent to 
that of the EU. Moreover, not only is the country aware of 
its normative distinction, especially in terms of the values 
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that diferentiate it from the West; it is increasingly self-
conscious and protective of its own identity. he analysis 
claims that the EU’s conventional approach of ‘naming-
and-shaming’ and demanding convergence on EU terms, 
has unintentionally contributed to the reinforcement of the 
regime, rather than its modernisation. In contrast, the recent 
EU practice of low-key technical engagement, premised on 
joint interests and shared ownership in some sectoral areas, 
has succeeded at developing traction with the government 
and making constructive policy inroads at diferent levels. 
he opportunities for expanding this engagement are 
discussed further in the text.
hird, the analysis recommends that the EU’s approach 
must not be binary, enforcing a choice between the EU and 
the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), or selective, especially 
in terms of ‘regional partnerships’, as postulated by the 
2016 GSS. Instead, it should be all-inclusive, exploiting 
opportunities to defuse inter-regional tensions and to 
develop compatibility between the EU and the EEU and its 
member states. he EU’s currently dichotomous approach 
causes deep anxiety and frustration in the neighbourhood; 
thereby unintentionally contributing to the endurance 
of historical alliances and diminishing the prospects for 
bringing stability and resilience back to the region.
Finally, the analysis concludes with a set of recommendations 
concerning how to make the EU-Belarus relations more 
enduring and sustainable.
2  Belarus is a small state and behaves like 
one
he behaviour of smaller states in international practice has 
traditionally been a source of concern and disquiet among 
policy-makers and practitioners, especially in relation to 
their ability to commit and deliver. As a rule, smaller states, 
particularly those positioned on the issure between major 
power constellations (e.g. the eastern neighbourhood, 
sandwiched between the EU and Russia), would often lend 
themselves to a conventional critique of their maverick-like 
behaviour, for being non-committal, recalcitrant and rent-
seeking, with one purpose only – to reinforce their regime’s 
grip on power to ensure its stability. While this may be 
true, the issue is far more complex than has previously been 
understood. By the European External Action Services´ 
(EEAS) own admission, the global environment has radically 
changed, becoming more connected, contested and complex 
(EEAS 2015). With it, changes in the balance of power are 
also observable: the international system has become more 
fragmented and increasingly multi-order (Flockhart 2016). 
Consequently, traditional security constellations and greater 
powers struggle to exert inluence and stay in control over 
their external environment, while smaller states seem to be 
enjoying more bargaining power and growing input into 
the security (im)balance, locally and globally. 
It is therefore important to gain knowledge about smaller 
states, in order to develop better capacity for predicting and 
estimating smaller states’ contributions to the global order, 
which hitherto have relied on the greater powers’ imagery of 
the outside. As Keohane argued four decades ago:
“hese are the badgers, mice and pigeons of international 
politics, and in many cases they have been able to lead 
the elephant… it is evident that small states on the rim 
of the alliance wheel can pursue active, forceful and even 
obstreperous policies of their own… and [we] have to 
listen to them and believe them as well” (1971:161–3). 
Hence, understanding their reasoning, intentions and 
patterns of behaviour may render a new outlook on how 
to leverage their behaviour, but it can also help them to 
develop their potential and enable them to ind a role to 
play. his is particularly instructive for the case of Belarus, a 
small state, situated between the EU and Russia/EEU, with 
which the EU has no formal bilateral relations; and yet, the 
country, which (akin to Azerbaijan) is ready to engage but 
on its own terms, has come to play an important mediating 
role in the conlict-torn eastern region. Let’s explore the 
following core tenets. 
2.1  Small states behave like mavericks and 
are non-committal
It is true that negotiating or let alone demanding compliance 
from smaller states has always been a challenge for established 
powers, including the EU. For example, it took several years 
of negotiation and several rounds of rejection (including an 
Association Agreement proposed by the EU, and a Strategic 
Modernisation Partnership proposed by Azerbaijan), before 
a Strategic Partnership Agreement was inally reached 
between the EU and Azerbaijan in May 2016; and even that 
required careful negotiations to ensure its future efective 
implementation (Van Gils 2016). Smaller states are very 
protective of their interests and sovereignty, and can be as 
di cult or easy to deal with as suits their own and wider 
regional agenda, which makes it important to understand 
their perspectives and needs. As Keohane contends, “why 
should the small state make special sacriices to strengthen 
its alliance or to abide by the spirit as well as the letter of the 
agreement? Recalcitrance may appear a better course than 
enthusiastic and self-sacriicing cooperation” (Ibid:163). 
Deiance and non-commitment for smaller states is 
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tantamount to skilfully managing their inite resources and 
leveraging their prospects for survival in an increasingly 
restrictive international environment. Hence, demanding 
large-scale political change, without contextualisation, is 
more likely to cause resistance and rejection than generate 
compliance and ownership.
Belarus presents a particularly instructive case, where 
rejection, resistance, oscillation and ‘non-commitment’ have 
deined Lukashenko’s regime. Just as the country signed its 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the 
EU in 1995, it renegaded from its commitments (most 
notably with respect to human rights) within a year, forcing 
the EU Member States to suspend the PCA ratiication and 
sanction and isolate the country for almost a decade (Goujon 
and Lynch 2005). Ironically, the government felt strangely 
relieved,2 especially in anticipation of the costly and painful 
long-term obligations to modernise to European standards. 
Instead, the loss of contractual relations with the EU was 
swiftly compensated for by a series of less-demanding treaties 
with Russia,3 leading to the creation of the Union State4 
with no deined terms and conditions.5 hroughout the next 
decade, President Lukashenko, however, feeling conined by 
and vulnerable to Russia’s pressure (Balmaceda 2014), made 
a series of reconciliation attempts with the West, albeit 
without tangible results (Korosteleva 2011): as soon as the 
EU political conditionality was back on the table (especially 
in 2010, prior to the presidential election), the government 
was in retreat to a zone of limited responsibilities – as part 
of the defunct CIS and a paper Union with Russia. he 
most instructive aspect, however, appears to be the process 
of Belarus’ negotiations with Russia over its membership in 
the Eurasian Customs and later Economic Unions (ECU 
and EEU).6 he country resisted every opportunity to be 
drawn into a new and seemingly unfavourable contractual 
framework, which it saw as undermining its sovereignty and 
interests. To delay the process, the government resorted to 
a series of ‘petty wars’ with Russia – from milk and sugar to 
2 Author’s interview in 1996 with members of the Belarusian Parliament. 
3 During 1995–99 the two countries signed a number of bilateral agreements, including the Treaty of Friendship 
(21/02/95), the Treaty on a Community of Sovereign Republics (02/04/96), the Russia-Belarus Union Chapter 
(23/05/97), the Treaty on Equal Rights of Russian and Belarusian Citizens (25/12/98), and the Treaty on the 
Creation of the Union State (08/12/99).
4 For more information about the ‘Union State’ please see https://mfa.gov.by/en/courtiers/russia/.
5 Some scholars have even suggested that the Union State became defunct even before the signature stage, so 
non-committal were the intentions of the Belarusian government towards fulilling their obligations (Balmaceda 
2014).
6 See Dragneva and Wolczuk (2012) for more details.
7 See the latest negative comments of President Lukashenko on their integration project, 20 September 
2016, available at http://eng.belta.by/president/view/lukashenko-wants-russia-to-decide-on-future-of-integration-
projects-94591-2016/.
8 Just as Belarus formally committed to the ECU and the future EEU.
energy issues – and succeeded in stalling the EEU launch by 
a number of years. However, even on becoming a member, 
Belarus felt more apart than part of the emergent trading 
project (Dragneva and Wolczuk 2014), manifesting its 
discontent by way of defying trade regulations, rejecting 
Russia’s unilateral embargo on EU goods, and questioning 
Russia’s current approach to Ukraine.7
To understand the rationale behind Belarus’ recalcitrance 
and lack of commitment is not simply to state the obvious. 
Rather, it is about anticipating these ‘swings’, understanding 
the needs and exploiting opportune moments to make 
relations more tractable. In the case of Belarus, this 
means that demands of political conditionality, sanctions, 
isolation, and the pledge to ‘work with the country, but 
not the government’ (European Commission 2006) may 
not necessarily yield efective and enduring EU-Belarus 
relations. he lack of political dialogue, however, could 
be overcome by other means – of sectoral and technical 
engagement (Korosteleva 2015) – as part of the new EU 
security strategy of principled pragmatism, to open doors 
for change and modernisation, as discussed in sections 2 
and 3.
2.2  Small states value agility and ‘strategic 
balancing’ 
Paradoxically, with a lack of commitment often comes more 
agility and responsiveness to external opportunities, and 
in Belarus’ geopolitical context, also ‘strategic balancing’ 
between the two greater powers – the EU and Russia. 
‘Strategic balancing’ involving pragmatic bargaining 
without major commitments has become a key policy, 
which is fundamental for the endurance and survival of 
Lukashenko’s regime; and it is now stipulated in all major 
oicial policy documents, having gained more prominence 
since 2007.8 he ‘balancing strategy’ was already manifest 
during the process of development of the Belarus Foreign 
Policy Doctrine from 1993 to 1997 (Ulakhovich 2001), 
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during which explicit references to either the EU or Russia 
were toned down and even removed. More recently, ‘strategic 
balancing’ has been reairmed in Belarus’ Economic Strategy 
2015–2030 (NIEI 2015), Foreign Policy course (2016),9 
and Military Doctrine (2016). Belarus’ Economic Strategy, 
for example, contends that Belarus must give priority to 
becoming a member of WTO (NIEI:57), developing strong 
economic relations with both the EU and the EEU, and 
sectoral cooperation particularly with Poland, Ukraine and 
Russia (Ibid:61). Belarus’ trade igures in 2015 relect this 
‘balancing strategy’, with Russia (39%) and the EU (32%) 
having become the two top global partners for Belarusian 
exports; and the EU’s role keeps growing with respect to 
Belarus’ imports and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), 
balancing Russia/EEU’s market dependency (20%; 8.5% 
growth rate since 2014; DG Trade). 
At the core of Belarus’ Foreign Policy priorities are ‘good 
neighbourly relations’ with all parties, which President 
Lukashenko noted back in 2007, ironically as he was signing 
the ECU treaty: “here can be no other way – we are an 
open country in the centre of Europe. We cannot and must 
not, by force of our geographical and historical location, 
prioritize one and be close to the other” (Lukashenko 
2007).10 In 2008 this strategy came to be known as the 
Golden Rule of Lukashenko’s foreign policy:
“…Belarus’ foreign strategy is based on three fundamental 
principles: political sovereignty, economic openness and 
equal partner relations with other countries. he ‘Golden 
Rule’ of our foreign policy is multi-vectoredness and 
interest in reciprocal contracts…” (Lukashenko 2008) 11
In 2016, Belarus MFA explicitly stated that: 
“Belarus is eager to use in full the potential of strategic 
partnership with Russia bilaterally, in the framework 
of the union State and other post-Soviet integrations. 
A comprehensive bilateral agenda is necessitated by 
geographical, historical factors, mutual complementarity 
9 http://mfa.gov.by/en/foreign_policy/priorities/ 
10 President Lukashenko’s State of the Nation Address, 24 April 2007, available at http://president.gov.by/ru/news_
ru/view/ezhegodnoe-poslanie-prezidenta-belarusi-belorusskomu-narodu-i-natsionalnomu-sobraniju-respubliki-
belarus-5869/ ͒ 
11 Lukashenko’s speech delivered at a meeting with Belarusian students, 12 February 2008, available at http://
president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/vystuplenie-prezidenta-belarusi-aglukashenkon-na-vstreche-so-studentami-
bgu-5872/ 
12 http://mfa.gov.by/en/foreign_policy/priorities/ accessed in September 2016.
13 http://belarusdigest.com/story/does-single-air-defence-system-bring-belarus-closer-russia-25295.
14 his issue of the compatibility between the EU and the EEU, which Belarus seeks, will be explored in the inal 
section of this policy analysis.
15 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113351.pdf.
of economies and close cooperation among the 
enterprises of both states… Among foreign policy 
priorities of Belarus in Europe is increased partnership 
with the EU countries, in the areas of mutual interest, 
including trade and investment, transport, transit, 
cross-border and regional cooperation, energy, and 
environmental protection.12
Belarus’ late Military Doctrine (2016) is another instructive 
example of ‘balancing’: while committed to reinforcing 
both the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) 
and the joint initiatives with the Union State, the Doctrine 
explicitly stipulates that these types of activities are subject 
to Belarusian law, which strictly forbids the participation of 
Belarusian Armed Forces in any military operations abroad 
(Ibid: 15). his explicitly underscores the defensive status 
of Belarus’ military and that it is open to building new 
alliances with countries other than Russia and the CSTO 
(Sivitski 2016). Recent eforts by Belarus’ government to 
moderate the dialogue between the EU and Russia over 
Ukraine, to establish links with the US military for training 
purposes (Bohdan 2016)13 and to develop technical military 
cooperation with China concerning the multiple launch 
rocket systems ‘Palanez’, serve as testimony to Belarus’ 
‘strategic balancing’, aiming to retain its independence and 
agility in response to external opportunities.
Remaining agile vis-à-vis its neighbours yields particular 
beneits for Belarus: it helped to sustain its miraculous growth 
until 2008, with an average of 11–14% rise in national GDP 
(J. Korosteleva 2007). And after the 2008 inancial crisis, 
which also afected Russia and the eastern neighbourhood, 
Belarus has explicitly pursued a diversiication strategy, with 
Russia and the EU being its top trading partners, followed 
by China and Ukraine. Belarus is now member of the EEU, 
but is not restricted to seeking and engaging in bilateral 
partnerships with other international players.14 A renewed 
dialogue with the EU may present particularly attractive 
opportunities, as is relected in the steady growth of EU 
imports from Belarus and its outward FDIs.15
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2.3  Smaller states could alter the status quo 
where the security balance is distorted 
and political dialogue is in deadlock
his is where smaller states particularly matter: what 
larger states take for granted, smaller states as a rule have 
to ight for. hey do so, however, in their own ‘narrow 
way’, concentrating on maximising their vital interests 
and ignoring almost everything else, for the stability and 
sovereignty of their own territory are their number one 
priority. he consequences of their actions, especially 
in today’s increasingly connected world, could either be 
destabilising (e.g. Syria, Ukraine), or opportune in terms of 
redressing regional security imbalances. As Moravcsik has 
argued, “there are situations where a leader of a weaker state 
may raise the cost of no-agreement to key constituents on 
the other side, thus rendering even unfavourable agreements 
relatively more attractive” (as cited in Balmaceda 2014: 8). 
Belarus, if empowered and supported, may come to play 
an important regional role as a conlict-mediator, as it 
volunteered to do in 2015, with the intention of brokering a 
dialogue between the EU and Russia over the military stand-
of in eastern Ukraine (known as the Minsk Agreements). 
Furthermore, if empowered to safeguard its own interests 
within the EEU by claiming WTO membership and 
gaining access to an increasing range of international 
business opportunities, Belarus, alongside other members of 
the EEU, may have the potential to assist in redressing the 
security imbalance created by Russian actions in the eastern 
region. his means that, not only could Belarus exercise a 
veto right to make Russia’s economic and political behaviour 
more orderly and leveraged; it could also reinvigorate the 
trading bloc itself, by making it structurally sounder and 
more open to the opportunities of harmonisation with 
other economic partners in the region, including the EU.16 
3  Belarus is normatively different but open 
to cooperation
3.1  Public perceptions: feeling positive while 
remaining different 
Since the launch of the EaP in 2009, when the EU irmly 
became part of Belarus’ Foreign Policy agenda, public 
16 he on-going work on an EU-Armenia partnership agreement, taking into account Armenia’s membership in the 
EEU, could ofer a useful way forward for supporting the progress in Belarus’ relations with the EU.
17 For more information please see the survey briefs Korosteleva (2013) and Korosteleva (2016b), available at 
https://www.kent.ac.uk/politics/gec/research/index.html for the 2013 and 2016 results, as well as https://www.
aber.ac.uk/en/interpol/research/research-projects/europeanising-securitising-outsiders/researchindings/. 
18 Our indings are corroborated by similar surveys recently run in the country. In particular, see Annual Survey 
Report: Belarus – 1st Wave (Spring 2016) available at http://www.enpi-info.eu/eastportal/publications//777/
EU-Neighbours-East-Annual-Survey-Report:-Belarus---Spring-2016. he survey (pp. 10–14) conirms the value 
associations established by our survey, as well as the normative diferences between the EU and Belarus. 
perceptions about its larger neighbour have become 
considerably more appreciative, relecting the government’s 
‘balancing strategy’ in external relations. In particular, our 
cross-temporal analysis of public surveys and focus groups 
conducted in 2009, 2013, and 2016 suggest that the EU’s 
continued (even if limited) sectoral engagement with the 
country has had a positive impact on the public perception 
and image of the EU, especially in terms of facilitating 
convergence and exploring joint interests in economic, 
political, security, and other areas of cooperation.
Our surveys indicate increasing levels of awareness about 
the EU (96%) and cognizance about its structure, functions, 
and policies, as compared to any other international 
organisation cited in the poll. his is further reinforced by 
an almost a twofold increase of interest in EU afairs (65%; 
+25 since 2009) and Belarus-EU relations in particular 
(70%; +22 since 2009). his is, however, on par with 
similar levels of interest in the EEU/CIS (64%; +21 since 
2009) and Russia (88%, +6 since 2009).17  
At least two thirds of the respondents are now familiar 
with the EaP initiative (~60%; a threefold increase since 
2009) and also believe that a new and stronger framework 
of cooperation with the EU is now necessary (60%). his 
cooperation should focus primarily on strengthening the 
BY-EU economic and trade relations (48%), as well as 
liberalising the visa regime (20%) and delivering inancial 
support (19%) to the country. he majority of respondents 
(54%; +12 since 2009) see the relationship with the EU as 
very positive, with a third highlighting its progressive nature. 
he most important change is that the majority (51%; 
+16 since 2009) now believe that Belarus-EU relations 
are now found in common (rather than the EU’s) values 
and interests – among which joint economic (47%; +13), 
security (and 45%; +10), and international legal (52%; 
+9) interests explicitly prevail. Moreover, a quarter of 
respondents contend that these relations are of a reciprocal 
and equal nature (+4 since 2009), which once again is in 
a stark contrast to the previous indings.18 his sense of 
interest convergence, especially in the areas of economic 
development, could ofer fertile ground for developing new 
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forms of cooperation and contractual relations, which could 
in the long-term introduce new behavioural norms and 
expectations (Korosteleva 2015). 
Although public perceptions and government narratives 
indicate a positive change, it is important to note that 
normatively Belarus continues to remain diferent – 
especially in terms of its values and associations –, which is 
imperative to recognise and engage with, while revising the 
EU foreign policy approach to the country and the region, 
more broadly. 
Our temporal survey comparison reveals enduring patterns 
of normative associations which respondents attribute to 
the EU, the EEU, and their own country, with signiicant 
diferences in the social modelling of democracy. In particular, 
the EU is determinedly associated with a liberal democracy 
model (Kurki 2010:372), premised on the values of market 
economy (48%), democracy (42%), economic prosperity 
(31%), human rights (29%), and personal freedoms (27%) 
– an astonishingly similar response to those in 2009 and 
2013, which suggests a irmly ixed image of the EU by the 
respondents. A model which they in turn connect the EEU 
with ofers a curious mix of qualities, a hybrid case, which, 
however, is closer to how the respondents depict their own 
country – what is known as a social-democratic model 
(Ibid: 373) in the wider scholarship: 
Liberal Democracy (EU)
- Market economy (48%)
- Democracy (42%)
- Economic prosperity (31%)
- Human rights (29%)
- Personal freedoms (27%)
Hybrid case (EEU)
- Market economy (32%)
- Peace/stability (25%)
- Multiculturalism (24%)
- Economic prosperity (22%)






- Cultural heritage (30%)
Interestingly, in relation to the EEU or Belarus, respondents 
do not seem to refer to ‘democracy’ as a value at all, but 
instead prioritise stability, security and cultural traditions, 
which is broadly relective of the survey indings in 2009 
and 2013 – while the same cannot be said about their 
perceptions of the EU. hese indings indicate a profound 
normative diference in the associative models of democracy 
and the expectations that respondents continue to attribute 
and distinguish all three cases by.
At the same time, market economy as a value emerged for 
the irst time, at the top of the list, to describe the EEU case 
by the respondents – a minor and yet important change. 
It suggests closer proximity between the EU and the EEU 
normative models in the respondents’ eyes. his juncture 
opens a new opportunity for cooperation and economic 
convergence, especially given that the EEU model is 
perceived as a one to aspire to. 
Why is acknowledging ‘normative diferences’ important? 
First of all, normative associations capture the general 
public’s immediate needs, concerns and expectations. 
Hence, decoding these perceptions is instrumental for 
devising a responsive and diferentiated EU policy. Second, 
the EU approach has hitherto been shaped and driven by 
the EU’s expected norms of behaviour, which are in stark 
contrast with those of Belarus (Korosteleva 2016a), resulting 
in unreciprocated unilateral promotion of EU values/norms 
and their limited acceptance among the Belarusians. Hence, 
a better understanding of what the associations are, and how 
to tap into them, to ensure greater policy legitimation, is a 
key priority for the revised European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP)19 and EaP. Finally, being perceived as ‘diferent’ in 
international relations often leads to alienation and an 
association with ‘threats’ and ‘insecurities’ (Diez 2006). 
Hence, it is important to shift perceptions of ‘diferences’ to 
those of ‘distinctions’, to ensure more a positive engagement 
and constructive dialogue. 
3.2  Transformative Power Europe by other 
means
Knowledge of normative associations and diferences is 
instrumental to the success of the EU neighbourhood 
policies, and may produce some unexpected transformative 
results in cases where formal relations are yet to be 
established.
19 he European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is a joint initiative for political cooperation and association between 
the EU and its neighbouring countries in North Africa, the Levant and Eastern Europe.
EUROPEAN POLICY ANALYSIS 2016:13 .  PAGE 7
he EU has experimented with a series of low-key technical 
engagements with Belarus, avoiding direct references 
to political conditionality and democracy promotion 
(although human rights have still been prominently on the 
agenda). While bilateral relations have yet to be developed, 
the EU has had an impact on the country using the 
EaP’s multilateral track and sectoral initiatives. Notably, 
through various thematic platforms for 2007–13, Belarus 
received over €300 million worth of funding in aid (some 
on-going since 2001), having become fully integrated in 
good governance, people-to-people, and socio-economic 
projects.20 he latter has included investing in human 
capital (health, gender equality, education, social security, 
culture, and children), environment and energy, migration 
and asylum, citizens and local authorities, and food safety.21 
A European Dialogue on Modernisation with Belarusian 
society was launched at the Commission’s initiative on 
29 March 2012,22 and now involves, via speciic projects, 
over 747 non-governmental organisations alone, which 
engage with EU-level activities.23 he agenda of meetings 
was set by the Belarusian stakeholders, identifying 
priorities for support and investment in the forthcoming 
years; and the language of decision-making was output-
driven, and codiied to European standards. In 2013 the 
Dialogue, for example, initiated two new programmes for 
Belarus: BELMED – supporting reforms in the healthcare 
system (€8 million) and RELOAD-2, ofering support for 
regional and local development in two regions – Grodno 
and Minsk (€3,5 million). Although limited in terms of 
direct contact with higher-levels oicials, the Dialogue 
was efective at the lower levels (including the respective 
Ministries), and helped regional authorities, in particular, 
to identify and promote development strategies and support 
local communities through training and grant-identifying 
strategies.24 As the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Afairs 
has conirmed, there were 59 on-going projects (with 
over 150 successfully completed in the past ten years, 
and many on-going after the Commission’s assessment!) 
being implemented in Belarus under EaP initiatives, 
especially in the areas of border modernisation and customs 
infrastructure, energy, transport, environment, education, 
and culture – with the total budget having quadrupled 
since 2010.25 For 2014–2017, the indicative allocation of 
funds is €129–158 million, in addition to €89 million in 
bilateral allocation.26 For education, training, and support 
for civil society in 2014 alone, €19 million was provided 
as part of the Annual Action Programme.27 In 2015, for 
projects focusing on social cohesion and employment, 
rural development, territorial planning, agriculture and 
food security, environment and sustainable management 
of natural resources, Belarus received over €24 million 
to support multiple projects and initiatives. Presently, 
the country participates in ERASMUS+, CBC, MOST, 
TAIEX, SOCIEUX instruments. In December 2015, a 
National Coordinating Unit for the EU TACIS programme 
in Belarus was replaced by the Centre for International 
Technical Assistance of EU (EU ITA) in order to support 
international technical assistance in Belarus and project 
implementation.28
How does this matter? In the absence of a direct bilateral 
framework, the EU’s technical engagement matters 
enormously. Not only does it exercise a socialisation efect, 
by way of introducing new norms and patterned behaviour, 
it also encourages the production of new shared norms which 
may trigger a change in the normative and institutional 
fabric of Belarusian society (Korosteleva 2015). However, 
much more could be done than just simply activating 
technical ties in the areas of mutual interest. If the issues 
of incompatibility and the lack of dialogue between the 
EU and the EEU/Russia were addressed, even if indirectly, 
via EEU members, this could ofer a whole raft of new 
opportunities for expanding EU leverage in the region.
4  Why does the EU need to develop a more 
inclusive and compatible approach?
4.1  The public is concerned with the security 
dilemma their government faces 
Geopolitics is back on the agenda, manifest not only in 
political narratives and the military actions in Ukraine, but 
also in the altering public perceptions across the region. he 
conlict in eastern Ukraine has not only changed domestic 
and regional power conigurations, it has also turned the 
20 http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/belarus/documents/eu_activities_in_belarus.pdf. 
21 EU ITA Centre in Belarus: hematic programme reports http://cu4eu.by/en.
22 See European Commission (2012a).
23 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/iles/eap-lyer-results.pdf 
24 See European Commission (2013)
25 See European Commission (2012a; 2012b)
26 See EEAS (2014) ‘Strategy Paper’, p. 18. 
27 See European Commission (2014) ‘Annual Action Programme
28 http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/belarus/projects/overview/index_en.htm. 
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hitherto competitive politics of the EU and Russia over 
the common neighbourhood into a conlict of allegedly 
incompatible trade policies, exacerbated further by a lack 
of political dialogue between the two powers. While for 
the EU ‘managing the relationship with Russia represents 
a key strategic challenge’ (GSS 2016:33), for the people 
of the region it is becoming a source of growing anxiety 
and deeply embedded insecurity. Belarus, accustomed to 
‘balancing’ and ‘bargaining’ with the two great neighbours, 
has also begun to feel the weight of the growing disjuncture 
in the inter-regional status quo.
While the appreciation of the EU as a strategic partner of 
the country is steadily rising, this perception comes under 
strain when faced with competing and now seemingly 
conlictual policy narratives from the great powers. While 
in 2013 almost 40% believed that cooperation between 
the EU and Russia/ECU was not only beneicial but also 
possible and practical, this number had decreased twofold 
(18%) by 2016. While the overwhelming majority (2/3) of 
the respondents support and approve of the government’s 
current course of action and foreign policy, a majority 
(51%) feels that the partnership with Russia and the EEU 
would be a safer bet in times of crisis and uncertainty (a rise 
by 14% since 2013), which compares to the just 11% who 
would prefer expanding the partnership with the EU. Only 
a third believe that multi-vectored policy – the Golden Rule 
of Lukashenko’s Presidency – is now at all implementable. 
An acute and caustic sense of rivalry bordering on 
incompatibility between the EU and the EEU is starting 
to become internalised among the respondents. hey have 
become increasingly divided on the prospects of possible 
cooperation and dialogue with both parties, which would 
make Belarus’ conventional ‘balancing’ ever harder to 
implement. he society feels truly torn, with a third 
believing that the EU and the EEU approaches are too 
diferent to reconcile; another third being convinced that 
they are absolutely incompatible, and the remainder hoping 
for the prospect of inter-regional cooperation and open 
access to both trading blocs. 
In addition to a growing sense of rivalry, there is also a 
tangible perception of overlapping competencies between 
the EU and the EEU emerging. If before there was a strong 
sense of diferentiation and complementarity between the 
two great neighbours, from late 2013 onwards the EU-EEU 
nexus has come to be seen as increasingly irreconcilable. 
Notably, as our 2013 survey indicated, the EU’s main 
competencies were seen as laying in the possession of 
‘know-how’ with respect to economic development, trade, 
democracy and good governance; those of the EEU/ECU 
was seen as complementary and as able to deliver primarily 
on trade, tourism, energy and employment opportunities. 
Hence, cooperating with both powers was seen as cost-
efective and essential for the survival of the Belarusian 
economy. he 2016 survey, however, revealed that both 
powers are now perceived as equally able (and thus 
competitive) of delivering the same beneits with respect 
to economic reform and trade, with the EEU favoured over 
the EU by a margin of almost three-to-one (65%:23%), 
and nearly by two-to-one when it comes to economic 
development (56%:33%). Furthermore, the beneits of 
cooperation with the EU seem to be restricted to trade and 
economic development only; the beneits of aligning with 
the EEU are seen as wider and more diverse, and include 
tourism (39% – often for recreational purposes), energy 
security (26%), employment/pension beneits (25%), 
and education (23%). In summary, the 2016 survey saw, 
in tangible terms, the rise of the cooperation dilemma 
for Belarus, which becomes ever more pronounced 
when juxtaposed with what respondents see as the most 
pressing issues for the country: living costs (37%) and 
employment/pension opportunities (20%). he market, 
to help satisfy those needs for now, clearly lies with the 
EEU. hese difering and now almost binary associations 
in relation to the EU and the EEU are profound in their 
implications, especially for the EU’s policy implementation 
and its sustainable dialogue with the country at the 
strategic level. he EU and the EEU are no longer seen 
as complementary projects; rather, they are increasingly 
perceived as overlapping and dichotomous – a trend that 
became observable as early as 2013. In light of the still 
strong pragmatic interest, the newly revised ENP needs to 
carefully recaibrate the format of its proposed engagement, 
to gain more traction with the country on sectoral issues 
(especially those related to health, food, pensions, and 
employment), and remain efective especially in terms of 
practical measures and instruments to help reinstate a sense 
of complementarity and congruence in the EU-Belarus-
EEU cooperation. 
4.2  How to make the EU approach more 
compatible?
Urgent measures are required to difuse the growing 
disconnection in public perceptions and policy narratives 
concerning the prospects of cooperation between the EU 
and the EEU/Russia. he existing ‘incompatibility’ of 
choice between the two trading blocs causes a considerable 
security imbalance, which could negatively afect the fragile 
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the EEU, but at the same time promote the EU interests 
which include trade” (Kostanyan 2016).  
Finally, if the EU were to advance its leverage over the region 
it would also have to recognise the EEU as a neighbouring 
regional bloc, with whom it needs to cooperate. As 
Bertelsmann’s (2016) paper suggests, this would not only 
address the issues of strengthening and making the EEU 
more structurally sound by international standards. By 
extension, it would also help to resolve the conlict over 
Ukraine, and possibly even restore a constructive dialogue 
with Russia (ibid).
Inter-regional cooperation could bring substantial beneits, 
especially for the EEU and the neighbouring EU countries. 
his could have an even greater efect if conlict zones 
(Transnistria; Abkhazia, Ossetia, etc.) and other CIS states 
were co-opted into this trade cooperation initiative. he 
net efect, as Bertelsmann’s paper argues, would be “of a 
magnitude that would represent a substantial impact on 
people’s purchasing power, especially in the EEU states…” 
(Ibid:16). Furthermore, “a free trade area between the EU 
and the EEU has a considerable potential to deescalate 
tensions” (Ibid), and serve as a basis for making a greater 
Europe – from Lisbon to Vladivostok – a reality one day.
5 Conclusions and recommendations
his analysis has examined Belarus’ changing domestic and 
regional context, which, it has argued, now presents a range 
of new opportunities for developing the EU’s dialogue with 
the country and the wider region. To make it more enduring, 
the EU needs to understand the geopolitical complexity of 
smaller states, and Belarus in particular. he following three 
tenets have been advanced to make the EU approach more 
efective, legitimate, and compatible with the country and 
the wider neighbourhood:
• he EU needs to recognise that Belarus, as a small 
state located between two larger neighbours, is 
keen to maintain cooperation with both, but on 
mutually agreeable terms – a ‘balancing strategy’. As 
a small state, it would struggle to commit to binary 
opportunities, which could cause a security dilemma 
for the government and its people. Rather, Belarus 
is eager to remain agile and responsive to its external 
environment, and would prefer an interest-driven 
deep sectoral cooperation to a ubiquitous agreement 
on EU terms.
• Belarus, like every other state in the eastern region, is 
normatively diferent. While it increasingly perceives 
domestic status quo in Belarus and the conlict-torn wider 
region, as the experience of Ukraine attests.
here is presently a wide array of opinions amongst the 
EU policy-makers and practitioners about how to attend 
to the issue of ‘incompatibility’ and, hence, the prospect of 
inter-regional cooperation between the trading blocs. he 
wider issue is to how to reset relations with Russia to make 
the EaP less conlictual and more beneicial for all parties 
concerned, to which the GSS and the revised ENP have not 
provided the answers.
his paper believes that while there may be diferent 
solutions to deal with these issues, they are at the same 
time intrinsically inter-linked and could ofer a unique 
opportunity for reconciliation if carefully considered. 
his is particularly important if Russia continues to be a 
challenge for the EU (as the GSS anticipates). here are a 
number of ways to leverage EU relevance and credibility in 
the region: one is via continued enhancement of bilateral 
relations with each EEU member state, including Belarus; 
and the other is, as Bertelsmann’s focus paper suggests, 
“to consider Putin seriously and pursue the idea of a free 
trade area between the Eurasian region and the EU. Such 
cooperation would dispel the fear that European trade 
policy is directed against Russia” (2016:9). Furthermore, 
the potential gains for all parties concerned could entail 
signiicant increases in real income, which in Belarus alone 
could grow by 4.9 per cent (Ibid:5), and positive inter-
dependencies – and in this way contributing to forging 
resilience and bringing stability back to the region. his 
is particularly likely in light of the fact that ‘a functioning 
market economy’ has been identiied as a top priority and 
‘shared value’ by all parties involved. 
Enhancing EU bilateral links with individual EEU member 
states is imperative, as it would empower them to realise 
their voice and exercise their right of veto if need be, across 
their respective regional structures. Hence, it is important 
that the EU continues to develop its structural relations 
with both Kazakhstan and Belarus especially, to ensure these 
two founding EEU partners have strong clout in the EEU. 
Armenia, another EEU member with whom the EU is 
currently going through a scoping exercise for the purposes 
of developing a tailored framework agreement, may present 
a very important case-study for Belarus to consider. As one 
EU oicial noted: “We need to establish a framework where 
the competencies of the EEU and the objectives of the EU 
do not clash. We want to respect Armenia’s obligations to 
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the EU as an important strategic partner, it nevertheless 
sees it as diferent and almost opposite in terms of its 
identity and values. As practice shows, a more tailored 
and low-key technical engagement is more efective 
and preferable, especially if it is on a continuous 
basis, as it has a far greater socialising efect29 with 
respect to international norms and standards, and 
consequently, a greater impact on behavioural patterns 
and expectations than any political conditionality. 
Hence, a wide-sectoral approach and cooperation 
would have more traction with the government, and 
in this way, could succeed in bringing about an ‘inside-
out’ change.
• Finally, recognising and engaging with the EEU 
is imperative, for a number of reasons: not only 
would it empower and stabilise the EEU individual 
member states and socialise them in the norms of the 
international trade community; it would also make 
them more resilient and independent in the pursuit of 
their own interests, within the EEU, thus redressing 
existing security imbalances within the wider region. 
Furthermore, a better structured and more functional 
region would bring more stability and prosperity to 
its recipients, and could lead to the establishment of 
a new inter-regional dialogue and closer economic 
convergence between the EU and Russia in the long-
term.
Recognising the above tenets is not about stating the 
obvious, but rather about ensuring a more inclusive and 
pragmatic approach from the EU, which could engender 
change and stability in the wider region.
29 Cross-temporal evidence of surveys conducted in 2013 and 2016 indicates a steadily growing positive 
appreciation of the EU as an important strategic partner for Belarus (http://kent.ac.uk/politics/gec/research/
index/html) , which in large part could be attributed to the EU’s continued low-key engagement with the country 
and the latter’s exposure to the beneits of cooperation.
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he survey30 examined the public attitudes of the Belarusian 
respondents towards the European Union (EU) and the 
Eurasian Customs/Economic Union (ECU/EEU). It was 
organised along three major blocs of questions:
• EU-Belarus relations: perceptions, interests and 
expectations
• Belarusian values and normative associations
• Geopolitics: Belarus between the EU and the ECU/
EEU 
his 2016 nation-wide representative survey was cross-
temporal, undertaken with reference to the two analogous 
surveys conducted in 2009 and 2013 for comparative 
purposes.31 he indings are comparable with the other 
available data, including the EU Neighbourhood Barometer 
East (Autumn 2012),32 the IISEPS polls,33 and Annual 
Survey Report: Belarus – 1st Wave (spring 2016).
he survey involved all six regions of Belarus, covering 52 
selected residential areas. he sampling was multi-staged, 
stratiied, and random, and included 1000 respondents 
(1643 contacts were attempted in total). he surveyed 
selection was representative of the population aged 18+ 
(urban and rural) by nationality, sex, region, age, and 
education. he interview lasted on average 40–50 minutes, 
using local languages for interlocution. he sample 
representation error was no more than + 3%. he survey 
included 12% random quality control on completion, 
undertaken by the Principal Investigator. 81 interviewers 
were involved in undertaking the survey. hey had on 
average 3–10 years of polling experience, and received 
relevant training in social research skills.   
Appendix: Information about the surveys 
